High-speed key encapsulation from NTRU

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 - ► Typically with real-world parameters and implementations

This talk: back to the basics. NTRU [HPS98]

- Now without NTRUEncrypt patents!
- ► Faster & more secure parameters

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Not this talk (see the paper!):

- Fast and constant time sampling routine
- History of NTRU
- Security analysis of parameters
- Discussion of alternatives
 - ▶ Ring-LWE, NTRU Prime, ..
- OW-CPA to OW-CCA2 transform [Den03] in QROM
 - 'Fusijaki-Okamoto transform for KEMs'

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Define S = Z[x]/Φ_n (i.e. polys of deg. n-1)
Φ_n = xⁿ⁻¹ + ... + x² + x + 1
xⁿ - 1 = (x - 1) • Φ_n

• Three parameters: prime n , coprime integers p and q	
▶ $n = 701, p = 3, q = 8192$	
• Define $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$	(i.e. polys of deg. n)
• Define $S = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi_n$	(i.e. polys of deg. n-1)
• $\Phi_n = x^{n-1} + \ldots + x^2 + x + 1$	
$\blacktriangleright x^n - 1 = (x - 1) \cdot \Phi_n$	

- ▶ sample $f, g \in S/3$
- lift f and g to f and g in R/q
- (i.e. coeffs. mod 3) (i.e. coeffs. mod 8192)

- Private key: f
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► $n = 701$, $p = 3$, $q = 0192$ ► Define $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$ ► Define $S = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi_n$ ► $\Phi_n = x^{n-1} + \ldots + x^2 + x + 1$ ► $x^n - 1 = (x - 1) \cdot \Phi_n$	(i.e. polys of deg. n) (i.e. polys of deg. n-1)
▶ sample $f, g \in S/3$	(i.e. coeffs. mod 3)
 lift f and g to f and g in R/q Private key: f 	(i.e. coeffs. mod 8192)
• Public key: $h = f^{-1} \cdot g \cdot (x - 1)$	
• Encrypt: $e = 3 \cdot r \cdot h + \text{lift}(m)$	
• Decrypt : $m' = e \cdot f \cdot f^{-1}$	(reduce $R/q \rightarrow S/3$)

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 - Mild assumptions¹ on distribution for f, g
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 $\Rightarrow h \equiv 0 \mod (q, \Phi_1)$
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- ▶ Φ₇₀₁ irreducible modulo 3 and q ⇒ Every candidate f is invertible
 - \Rightarrow Easier constant time

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Some XOF calls, some additional data for QROM

► Sampling in *S*/3 (**K**, **E**)

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- Target platform: Intel Haswell, AVX2

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• Example: binary polynomials mod $(x^7 - 1)$

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 \blacktriangleright \Rightarrow Still 'just' permutations

New Goal: permutations on 701 bits

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- Benchmarks on Intel Core i7-4770K (Haswell) at 3.5GHz
 - ► Keygen: ~0.1ms, Encaps/Decaps: ~0.02ms

Comparison

Comparison is hard: assumptions and optimizations vary

See paper for footnotes

	K	Е	D	pk	sk	ct
Passively secure KEMs						
BCNS	2.5 <i>m</i>	4.0 <i>m</i>	482 <i>k</i>	4096	4096	4224
NewHope	89 <i>k</i>	111k	19 <i>k</i>	1792	1824	2048
Frodo	2.9 <i>m</i>	3.5 <i>m</i>	338 <i>k</i>	11.3 <i>k</i>	11.3 <i>k</i>	11.3k
CCA2-secure KEMs						
Streamlined NTRU Prime 4591 ⁷⁶¹	6.1 <i>m</i>	60 <i>k</i>	97 <i>k</i>	1600	1218	1047
spLWE-KEM	337 <i>k</i>	814 <i>k</i>	785 <i>k</i>	?	?	804
Kyber	78 <i>k</i>	120 <i>k</i>	126 <i>k</i>	2400	1088	1184
NTRU-KEM (this work)	308k	49k	67k	1422	1140	1281
CCA2-secure public-key encryption						
NTRU ees743ep1	1.2 <i>m</i>	57 <i>k</i>	111k	1120	1027	980
Lizard	98 <i>m</i>	35 <i>k</i>	81 <i>k</i>	467 <i>k</i>	2.0 <i>m</i>	1072

Takeaway

- When choosing the right parameters ..
- ... constant time key generation can be fast
 - ... not just encryption / decryption;
- .. and constant time sampling can be fast
- ... without decryption failures
- NTRU can be a fast ephemeral CCA2-secure KEM

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- Code is available (CC0 Public Domain): https://joostrijneveld.nl/papers/ntrukem
- Bit permutations tool included (CC0 Public Domain): https://joostrijneveld.nl/code/bitpermutations

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Encapsulate and decapsulate

Encaps(h)

1: $c_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\mu}$ 2: $m = \text{Sample}\mathcal{T}(c_0)$ 3: $c_1 = \text{XOF}(m, \mu, \text{coins})$ 4: $k = \text{XOF}(m, \mu, \text{key})$ 5: $e_1 = \mathcal{E}(m, c_1, h)$ 6: $e_2 = \text{XOF}(m, \text{len}(m), \text{qrom})$ **Output:** Ciphertext (e_1, e_2) , session key k.

$\mathsf{Decaps}\left((e_1,e_2),(f,h)\right)$

1:
$$m = \mathcal{D}(e, f)$$

2:
$$c_1 = XOF(m, \mu, \texttt{coins})$$

3:
$$k = XOF(m, \mu, \text{key})$$

4:
$$e'_1 = \mathcal{E}(m, c_1, h)$$

5:
$$e'_2 = XOF(m, len(m), qrom)$$

6: if
$$(e'_1, e'_2) \neq (e_1, e_2)$$
 then

7:
$$k = \bot$$

Output: Session key k