


# ARMed SPHINCS:

Computing a 41 KB signature in 16 KB of RAM

Andreas Hülsing<sup>1</sup>, **Joost Rijneveld**<sup>2</sup>, Peter Schwabe<sup>2</sup>

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven<sup>1</sup>  
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The Netherlands




**PQCRYPTO**  
**ICT-645622**

# SPHINCS

- ▶ SPHINCS: Stateless, practical, hash-based, incredibly nice cryptographic signatures [BHHLNPSW15].
- ▶ Hash-based schemes: conservative choice
  - ▶ Hash functions do not fall to Shor (but halved by Grover)
  - ▶ One-way functions necessary for signatures [Rom90]
  - ▶ Tight security reductions
- ▶ SPHINCS-256 in PQCRYPTO's 'Initial recommendations'


# SPHINCS-256

- ▶ Large hash-tree, height  $h = 60$
- ▶ Every  $d = 12$ -th layer: sign child node
  - ▶ Effectively a hypertree of  $h/d = 5$  Merkle trees [Mer90]
  - ▶ Trade signature size for time
- ▶ Sign messages using  $2^{60}$  leaf nodes




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- ▶ Sign messages using  $2^{60}$  leaf nodes
- ▶ No need to remember index: **stateless** [Gol87]



# Platform

- ▶ STM32L100C development board
- ▶ Cortex M3, ARMv7-M
- ▶ libopenm3 firmware
- ▶ 32MHz, 32-bit architecture
- ▶ 16 registers
- ▶ 256KB Flash
- ▶ **16KB RAM**




# Treehash

- ▶ Some internal tree is too large: 2MB
  - ▶  $2^{16}$  leaf nodes


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- ▶ Treehash [Mer90]: only store required nodes
  - ▶ Maintain a stack: at most  $\log(n) = 16$  nodes (or  $\log(8) = 3$ , in the example below)



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







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
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
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
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# Treehash

- ▶ Some internal tree is too large: 2MB
  - ▶  $2^{16}$  leaf nodes
- ▶ Treehash [Mer90]: only store required nodes
  - ▶ Maintain a stack: at most  $\log(n) = 16$  nodes (or  $\log(8) = 3$ , in the example below)
- ▶ Trace 32 'random' paths through tree



# Other aspects

- ▶ Streaming data
  - ▶ Signature does not fit in memory
    - ▶ ..and is generated out of order
  - ▶ Sizable messages do not fit in memory
  - ▶ Key material does not fit in memory
  - ▶ ...
  
- ▶ Optimising ChaCha<sub>12</sub>
  - ▶ 685818 calls per signature
  - ▶ 65% of total computation costs



# Performance

- ▶ Works on 16KB RAM ✓
  - ▶ Uses less than 7KB
- ▶ Key generation: 0.88 seconds
- ▶ Signing: 18.41 seconds
- ▶ Verification: 0.51 seconds

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- ▶ Implemented XMSS<sup>MT</sup> [HRB13], configured similarly
  - ▶ Stateful: process leafs incrementally

# Conclusions

- ▶ Stateless is expensive, but not prohibitively so
  - ▶ Signing 30x as expensive as XMSS<sup>MT</sup>
  - ▶ Verification similar to XMSS<sup>MT</sup>
  - ▶ (Key generation much cheaper)
- ▶ Feasible on limited platforms
  - ▶ ..although not very practical for interactive applications
- ▶ Code is available (public domain):  
<https://joostrijneveld.nl/papers/armedsphincs/>

# Reference I



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